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Abstract- In tbis paper, we propose a traceable
anonymous electronic casb, based on Digital
Signature Scbeme(DSS), but witb difference
wbereby tbe coin's anonymity can be revoke
by a quorum of tbe server. Our system, unlike
previous anonymous systems, can prevent
crimes from successfully being perpetrated,
and employs revocation to do so. We
introduce tbis traceable electronic casb tbat
require a quorum of servers to produce a
signature to tbe receiver, and a (possibly
different) quorum to be unblended tbe coin.
We also applied the method of bints to our
protocol to enable tracing of correctness of tbe
signature, and tbe corresponding coins.
1.0 Introduction
The traceable electronic cash is a method to
enable the generation of blind signatures, which
can later be unblended by the signer. It is
analogy that the cash money. Where each cash
money has a serial number. The particular cash
money can be identified by checking on the
serial number whether it has been black listed.
This traceable electronic cash is in sharp contrast
to traditional blind signatures, which are
information theoretically blinded to the signer.
The typical application where the need for this
functionality arises is for cases where privacy of
individuals is assured until some criminal or
otherwise unusual activities is detected. Upon
detection. identification of the origin of a
signature becomes important in identifying the
source of the unwanted activity. This is applied
to private access tokens, authorized anonymous
account, and here, electronic money.
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Both the generation and the tracing are
performed under quorum action. The generation
protocol is distributed to increase the availability
and security of the system; the tracing protocol is
distributed in order to increase the· availability of
the system, and to introduce control. We present
a method to trace the electronic cash for DSS
signatures.
2.0 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
We use DSS [I] as the underlying signature
algorithm. Note that. since we use different
moduli at different times, we use [op]z to denote
the operation op mod z.
Key generation. A DSS key is composed of
public information p,q,g, a public key y and a
secret key x, where:
I. p is a prime number of length I, where I
is a multiple of 64 and 512
~ 1~ 1024.
2. q is a 160 bit prime divisor of p-I.
3. g is an element of order q in Z· p .The
triple (p,q,g) is public.
4. x E u Zq is the secret key of the signer.
5. y = [g.r ]p is the public verification
key.
Signature Algorithm. Let m E Zq be a hash of
the message to be signed. The signer picks a
random number k E u Zq, calculates [k-']q
(w.l.o.g k and k'\ values compare to DSA
description are interchanged), and sets
k-I
r ::: [[g ]p]q
s =[kern + xr)]q
The pair (r,s) is the signature on m w.r.t the
signer whose public key is y =[g X] P •
Verification Algorithm. A signature (r,s) of a
message m can be publicly verified by checking
that
?
r ~[[gmA-f y,S-1 ]p]q .
The verifier have (m,r,s) and y. So he can proof
this equation.
Note that:
-I -I -1-1[[gInS y'S ]p]q =[[gInS gUS ]p]q
=[[g(m+XT)s-1 ]p]q = [[gr l ]p]q = r
From
s = [kern + xr)]q => S-1 = [k- I (rn + xrrl]q
=> k-I =(rn + xr)s-I
3.0 Requirements
We wish to obtain a signature scheme where
blind signatures can be distributively produced
by a quorum of trustees, and these signatures
always can be unblended by (possibly different)
quorum of trustees. Let the signature key x be
distributed using a (ts, n) secret sharing scheme,
and the tracing key Xt distributed using (t I , n)
secret sharing scheme. We want a signature
scheme with the following properties:
Requirement I:Correctness
Signatures can be correctly generated using a
(3ts, n) threshold scheme, by any size (3ts + I)
quorum out of the n trustees, even in the case
where a coalition of up to ts dishonest
participants attempt to disrupt the generation of
valid transcripts.
Requirement 2: Quorum tracing
Valid signatures can always be unblended, i.e.
signatures matched to signing session or vice
versa, by any size (4 + 1) quorum out of the n
servers. In other words, no coalition of less than
ts + 1 signature servers, interacting with honest
servers a polynomial number of times in the
signing and tracing protocols, can produce a
valid signature that will not be traced to the tag
of one of the signing session by any group
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containing at least 4 + 1 honest server in the
tracing protocol [2].
4.0 Tools
Let us briefly describe what existing tools we
will use in the protocol specification before
describing these in more detail:
I. Polymoniallnterpolation Secret Sharing
This is the well-known result in which a secret s
is shared by choosing at random a polynomial
itx) of degree t, such that itO)=s, and distributing
n points on this polynomial. Given any t+ lout of
the points, the entire polynomial f can be
reconstructed, and specifically, itO) can be
produced. However, given only t such points on
the polynomiual, each secret s = itO) is equally
likely. We call this a (t,n) sharing ofs.
2. Join Zero Secret Sharing
This protocol generates a sharing of a "secret"
whose value is zero. Such a protocol is that each
players deals a sharing of the value zero [3].
3. Computing Reciprocals
Given a secret k e Zq' shared among players
Pi,...... POl we want to generate the value
[gk- I ]p without revealing information on k or k -
I
5.0 Description of the Traceable
electronic cash protocol
5.0.1 Foundation of the DSS
-Given a distributed held value k, shared using
(ts, n) threshold scheme, we want to calculate
gk-
I
without revealing any secret information.
•The server share a secret a, using a (ts, n) secret
sharing scheme, a value b=O using (2ts, n) secret
sharing scheme. Each server Sj calculate Vi = [ki a;
+ bi ]q, Ai = [ga, ]p • A is calculated as the (ts, n)
interpolation of the shares of A. v as (2ts, n)
.,
interpolation of shares of v. Result [A v ]p =
[g a[k·1 a-I] ] = [gk- I ]p is output.
5.0.2 Signature Generation
istributed using (ts, n) secret
... __ , .., distributed using (t I , n) secret
sharing scheme.
I. Server distributively generate
• A random secret x using (ts, n) secret
sharing scheme.
• A random secret XI using (t I , n) secret
sharing scheme. XI is link with identity
of the receiver R.
2. Each server publish his share of public key
Yj= [gXi]p,andhi= [gX'j ]p'
3. Each server S; then prove knowledge of his
secret share Xi to the other server.
4. f server, generate two random secret k, a
E Zq' secret share using (ts, n) secret
sharing scheme. Let kj , ll; denote the share
held by Sj.
5. . Sj also distributively generate b, in (2ts, n)
zero-sharing, where server S; has share bj . Sj
also distributively generate (3ts, n) zero
sharing on c, where server Sj has share Cj.
6. Server compute r = [gk-I]p by following
steps s follows:
• Server Sj compute Vi = [kill; + b;]q , Aj =
[ga,]p' The server publish (Vi, Aj).
• The participants compute A by (ts, n)
interpolation of Ai.
• The participants compute v as (2ts, n)
interpolation of Vi'S and calculate r =
-I[A'] p • r send to R
7. The receiver R has a message m E Zq that
wants to signed. R then compute (ts, n)
secret sharing (mi. m2 ..... mn) for m, with
public information (Mit M2 ...... Mn) =
(gm, gm. ) and a (ts. n) secret sharing
(r, , r2 rn) of r, with public information
(R1 R2 ,oooooo Rn) =
(h'l .......h'. ) =(g v. ,.......g v. ).
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8. -Server (ts, n) interpolate tag (g m , h' ).
-Server generate s; = [kj(m; + x;rj) + c;]q . For
method of verifying shares of S; , refer to
section 5.0.1.1
and section 5.0.1.2.
-Server (ts, n) interpolate s = [k(m + xr)]q
and send S to R.
9. R verified (m,r,s) is a valid OSS on m.
5.0.3 Proof during complain on Signature
Server
If a complain receive by signature servers, then
server S; publish Sj mj ri
[gkj]p,[l']p,[gC,]p' And proof to other
server that :
log ti (g" g-C, gki(-m,))';-I =logg Y, =X jg
-Each server verifies that above proofs are valid
and that M j =gm j ,R j =hr, .
-Then. server verifies (as above) the correctness
of [gk, ]p.[li]p ,[gC,]p'
-Any server who fails/refuses is replaced, and the
signature generation restarts [4].
5.0.3.1 To trace the coin
Note that, the User JD. is link with XI' The series
that store by signature server is in the form
below: tag =(gm ,h'), coin (Le. m,r,s).
For example, server S want to trace user id for a
particular coin (m,r,s). When tracing coin (m,r,s),
For example the server know what tag to be
traced. Example, see whether the tag Xt is match
the Xt= 10. So the procedure as below:
Given a description of (m,r,s), and its related tag,
tag=(taga,tagb)=(gm,h'), we check
this coin's secret tag number.
log ",,_I tagb =log __ I h' =logg' grx, =XIlag. g
Check the value of XI (e.g. Xl =10) . This holds
iff coin corresponds to the tag. The value Xl is
distributed over the server. Then the server can
check the [0 of user for Xt = 10. This is to
prevent money laundering where the user ID will
be identified based on the coin and tag.
5.0.3.2 Modified method to trace a coin
Another way of tracing is for example, set Xt,=
10 for a certain user, trace the coin (m,r,s) with
its tag, tag =(gm ,h')
? ?
h,' x, h" 10,
. h k =g , i.e. =g whereI.e. c ec
the value h' is from the tag, r is from the coin.
This is to prevent blackmailing, where the coin
owner is known, but to trace the coin of such
owner.
6.0 Hint-generation
6.0.1 Hint generation using EI Gamal
encryption: Previous work done
Details of this section kindly refer to [5]. Let
xh be a private key distributively held by the
tracing servers; Yh =[g x. ] p is the
corresponding public key.
I. The receiver calculates an EIGamal
encryption of m: He chooses ayE
Zq and calculates (a,b) = (mg' ,Y/ ).
This pair is sent to the servers..
2. (a) The servers distributively compute
hint =a x," / b . The jointly
I
generated from hint; by a quarom of
server, hint, will be linked with the
identity of the receiver. Xh is always
fixed value hold by the server
(b) In order to prove that every server
has performed the correct
exponentiation the server run a protocol
for proving valid exponentiation. This is
proof that
logo (hint, .b) = logg (Yhl) = xh, for
a given quadruple (a, g, (hint;.b), Yhi)'
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(c ) The servers compute hint as the
Lagrange-weighted product of the
shares hint; of the servers in the quorum.
(This value equals [m x., ]p if R did not
cheat). Note that, after reconstruction,
( , )x./hint =[ mg J =[m x" J ./ (gxJr)' P P
,-Ie
hint =[Lhint;] =m XJr . Where
,-j
,-Ie
[L hint t] is Reconstruction of Secret
,-I
Sharing by k servers in the quorum.
And m =[mxJr ]11 x•.
6.0.2 Hint generation using RSA
cryptograpby : Modified method
Let x h be a private key distributively held by the
tracing servers; Yh, =[g x., ]p is the
corresponding public key.
3. The receiver calculates an RSA
encryption of m: He chooses a d E
Zq and calculates (a,b)
( [m d ] p , Yh, ). This pair is sent to the
servers.
4. (a) The servers distributively compute
hint; = [((md)x., )"]p =[mx,;]p.
The jointly generated from hint, by a
quarom of server, hint, will be linked
with the identity of the receiver. Xh is
always fixed value hold by the server
(b) In order to prove that every server
has performed the correct
exponentiation the server run a protocol
for proving valid exponentiation. This is
proof that
logm (hint;) =logg (Yh;) = xh, for a
given quadruple (a, g, (hint;), Yhi ).
(c ) The servers compute hint as the
Lagrange-weighted product of the
shares hint; of the servers in the quorum.
(This value equals [m X" ] p if R did not
6.0.3 Tracing from known signed message
to signing session
cheat). Note that. after reconstruction,
hint; =[((mdy'.,)e]p =[mX'i]p.
r:k[I hint I] is Reconstruction of Secret
r:\
Sharing by k servers in the quorum.
And m =[m x, ]"X'.
Given a description (m,r,s) , the tracing servers
compute a value tracec = [mx,]p from (m,r,s)
and a particular fixed value Xb' Then they
compare tracec with the stored hints. hint can be
computed by a quarom of server based on hintj.
7.0.3 Depositing a Coin
7.0.4 Tracing the coin
7.0.2 Spending a Coin
A spent coin is deposited by forwarding the
transcript (y, SigBank(y), c, SigAlice(c)) to the
Bank. The Bank verifies SigBank(y) and also
verifies SigAlice(c). The bank also double check
whether this transcript hs been deposited before.
If everything is okey, the Bank will debits to
Shop and credits the Alice's account. The bank
then saves the transcript in a database containing
all transcripts, and checks of overspending of the
coin [6).
A coin (x,s), where x is the secret key. This
secret key can produce a signature signed by
Alice, SigA1iee-
1. The spender of the coin, Alice, send (y,
SigBank(y)) to the payee, Shop. The shop
verifies the validity of (y, SigBank(y)) by
using Bank's public key.
2. The shop sends the challenge c to Alice.
Which is a value set by Shop.
3. Alice sends the answer SigAlicic) to the
Shop. The shop can verified this
signature by using Alice's public key y.
The shop will store (Y, SigBank(y), C,
SigAlice(c)).
Where
r:k
hint = [L hint I] = mX' •
r=\
If tracec ;: hint for a particular record, then the
signed message corresponds to the signing
session of this record. Since server link hint with
receiver lO, then server can trace the receiver lO
based on (a,b)= (mgY,y/) of receiver in El
Gama! encryption, and (a,b) = ([m d Jp , Yh, ) in
RSA cryptography.
7.0 Protocol for E-Money System
7.0.1 Withdrawing a Coin
Here, we represent a coin by a pair (x,s) where x
= secret key of the coin pair. Also, s=SigBank(y),
and y=public key of the coin pair. In order to
perform the withdrawal of a coin, the following
protocol is executed:
1. withdrawer, whom we will call Alice,
select a secret key, x, by himself. And
using the RSA code, to generate a
public key y. She proves her identity to
the Bank, where she shows the id, id to
bank, which bank verified she is the
customer.
2. By cooperation of a quorum of Bank to
compute a signature s = SigBank(y). And
the bank servers get a tag tag, linked to
this signed message, but not linkable by
less than a quorum of bank servers. The
tag is stored in secure database.
The Bank can trace the signature SigBank(y) to get
its tag tag. This tag will expose the identity id of
the withdrawer, i.e. Alice. The Bank can also
input the id of Alice, to verified whether it is
correct signature SigBank(y) that need to be
verified. Details kindly refer to 5.0.3.
8.0 Conclusion
In this paper, we based on a signature scheme
Digital Signature Scheme, but further modified
to enable the coin to be traced. I.e. we enclosed a
tag to each coin. The serial number of the coin
can be traced by checking on the coin and its tag.
This serial number can identified certain coin
that has been misusedlblackrnail. However, such
task requires the join quorum of certain amount
of server to do it. The signature of the coin also,
is being generated by another quorum of server.
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